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A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA: THE
CASE FOR FEDERAL COMMON LAW

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) l provides for the abatement
and clean up of hazardous waste releases by imposing strict liability
on parties responsible for these releases. In addition, CERCLA creates a trust fund to finance cleanups when the government cannot
locate responsible parties. Although early drafts of CERCLA contained express provisions imposing joint and several liability and allowing contribution among defendants, CERCLA's sponsors
deleted these provisions as part of a compromise measure to ensure
the bill's passage. Despite the deletion of the joint and several liability provision, courts have applied ajoint and several liability standard to multi-defendant CERCLA cases by looking to federal
common law principles.
This Note analyzes whether, in light ofjudicial creation and imposition of a federal common law rule ofjoint and several liability, a
right of contribution among defendants should also be available
under CERCLA. Contribution among defendants is an important
component of a joint and several liability scheme because it ensures
that responsible parties other than those actually held jointly and
severally liable share the burden of liability. Section I of this Note
discusses the statute and the history ofjoint and several liability and
contribution under CERCLA. Section II considers and rejects the
argument that notwithstanding the deletion of the contribution provision, Congress created a right of contribution under CERCLA
either expressly or by dear implication. Section III analyzes
whether courts should fill the gaps in CERCLA's liability provisions
with federal common law. This Note argues that despite judicial
hostility toward creating special federal common law, the gaps in
CERCLA's liability provisions and the strong federal policy of abating hazardous waste releases require the courts to fill the gaps in
CERCLA's liability allocation scheme with a federal common law
right of contribution. This Note also concludes that CERCLA's legislative history and statutory scheme indicate that Congress empowered federal courts to fashion a federal common law right of
contribution.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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I
AN OVERVIEW OF LIABILrTY UNDER

A.

CERCLA

The Statute

CERCLA provides for emergency response, liability for the
costs of cleanup, and compensation in the event of a release of a
hazardous substance. 2 CERCLA also provides for the cleanup of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites. 3 The Act bestows broad authority on the President to take remedial and
abatement action when the actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance presents an imminent and substantial threat to public
health or welfare. 4 CERCLA also establishes a Hazardous Substances Response Fund (the "Superfund") 5 of $1.6 billion raised'
through general revenues and a tax on the oil and chemical industries. 6 The Superfund reimburses government or private parties for
the costs of hazardous waste site cleanup when the government cannot locate the responsible parties or the responsible parties fail to
7
begin their own cleanup actions.
Under CERCLA, persons responsible for the release or
threatened release of hazardous wastes are strictly liable8 for
2 Id. §§ 9604, 9606 & 9607.
3 Id. "Response" under CERCLA includes actions such as storage, confinement,
dredging or excavations, and repair or replacement of leaking containers. Id.
§ 9601(23)-(25).
4 Id. § 9604.
5 Id. § 9631(a), (c).
6 Taxes on oil and certain chemicals constitute 87.5%o of the $1.6 billion
Superfund. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611(a)-(b), 4661(a)-(b) (1982). General revenues make up
the remaining 12.5%b. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b).
CERCLA's taxing mechanism, which finances the Superfund, expired on September
30, 1985. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d). Despite several attempts, Congress did not pass a
reauthorization bill during the 1984 session. In the 1985 session, however, the Senate
has passed a $7.5 billion, five-year reauthorization bill, S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REC. S12034 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985). The bill would raise $5.4 billion from a
new tax on manufacturers and raw material producers with sales of more than $5 million
a year. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEV. (BNA) 892 (Sept. 20, 1985).
The House has not yet passed a $10 billion, five-year reauthorization bill, H.R.
2817. On October 23, 1985, the House Ways and Means Committee approved the bill
which includes a waste-end tax on disposal facilities and an excise tax on manufacturers
and importers. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEv. (BNA) 1075 (Oct. 25, 1985). If H.R. 2817
does not reach the House floor by Thanksgiving, the House-Senate conference committee probably will not consider it before Christmas, and reauthorization will be delayed
until 1986. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEV. (BNA) 1251 (Nov. 15, 1985).
7 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1982).
8 CERCLA's liability is defined as strict by reference to § 311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(c) (1982), a provision for
recovery of cleanup costs for spills into navigable waters. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Courts
have interpreted § 311 as imposing a strict liability standard. United States v. Tex-Tow,
Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d
1305 (7th Cir. 1978). By referring to § 311, CERCLA's drafters intended "liability" to
trigger a strict liability standard. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement by Sen.
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cleanup costs and damage to natural resources. 9 The strict liability
provisions embrace four categories of parties: (1) persons presently
owning or operating a polluting facility, (2) persons owning or operating a polluting facility at the time of disposal, (3) persons arranging for disposal, treatment, or transport of wastes (including waste
generators), and (4) persons accepting wastes for transport to disposal or treatment facilities.10 A defendant faced with a CERCLA
claim may escape liability only if he proves that an act of God, an act
Randolph: "We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of
liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act [FWPCA] .

. .

. I understand this to

be a standard of strict liability. . . . As under section 311, due care or the absence of
negligence with respect to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance does
not constitute a defense under this act."). See also 126 CONG. REc. 31,966 (1980) (letter
from Assistant Attorney General Alan A. Parker to Rep. Florio and remarks of Rep.
Florio).
Finally, every district court addressing the issue has held that CERCLA's liability
section imposes strict liability. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
See also United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvT. L.

INST.)

20,385, 20,386-

87 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) (only § 107(a), and not § 106(a), permits joint and several
liability); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 ENvrL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,272, 20,274 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984) (CERCLA § 107(a) holds defendants strictly liable); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing United States v. Price for proposition that "past off-site generators
should be held to a standard of strict liability"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (standard of strict
liability applies equally to §§ 106(a), 104, and 107(a) of CERCLA); United States v. A&F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (strict liability is intended
standard under CERCLA; Congress did not preclude imposition of joint and several
liability).
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) & (C) (1982).
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of CERCLA gives that
agency two enforcement options. Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging
Law of GeneratorLiability, 14 ENvmL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10,224, 10,225 (1984). The

EPA may seek either monetary relief in cost recovery actions authorized by § 107, 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), or may seek injunctive relief in abatement actions authorized by
§ 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). Comment, supra, at 10,225. States and any other party
incurring cleanup costs may also seek reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B).
10 42 U.S.C.§ 960 7 (a) (1982). Subsection (a) of § 9607 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
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of war, or an act of a third party caused the damage.

1

B. Joint and Several Liability
Although CERCLA holds responsible parties strictly liable, the
statute fails to prescribe a method for allocating that liability when
multiple parties bear responsibility for a hazardous release. CERCLA's drafters originally provided for joint and several liability coupled with a right of contribution, but omitted both provisions from
the final bill in order to appease opponents of the legislation who
viewed the provisions as "grossly unfair."' 12 In enforcement actions
to date, the executive branch has repeatedly called for joint and several liability under CERCLA, 13 while the chemical industry has argued for apportioned liability.' 4 The government has consistently
prevailed in the district courts.' 5 Thus, the judiciary has applied
joint and several liability to CERCLA cases, notwithstanding Congress's deliberate deletion of such a provision; it has not, however,
decided whether CERCLA permits contribution among jointly and
severally liable defendants. An examination of the legislative history of CERCLA's liability provisions and of the district court decisions on joint and several liability lays the groundwork for analyzing
the contribution question.
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id. § 9607(a).
I
Iii. § 9607(b). The definition of third party excludes agents, employees, and
those individuals in a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the defendant. Id.
§ 9607(b)(3). Also, the defendant must show that he exercised due care and took precautions against any foreseeable third party acts. Id.
12
See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
14 Apportioned liability in this context means that the government would bear the
burden of proving the contribution of each defendant and would pay any share of the
costs it could not allocate. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965). In contrast, if liability is joint and several, both the burden of proof of allocation and the risk
that not all costs can be allocated fall on the defendants (assuming the government can
identify responsible parties that are financially solvent). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 433A, 875, 881 (1979); Comment, supra note 9, at 10,231. For text of
§§ 433A, 875, and 881, see infra note 34.
15 See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text (reviewing trial court treatment).
No appellate court has directly confronted the question. But see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) (dicta suggesting application of
joint and several liability to CERCLA claim).
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1. Legislative History
CERCLA resulted from a compromise measure drafted in the
Senate at the end of the ninety-sixth Congress. 16 The Act developed primarily from two bills, H.R. 7020 and S. 1480,17 which explicitly provided for the imposition of strict liability on a joint and
several basis and for contribution.1 s To ensure passage of hazardous waste legislation before the end of the 1980 session, the bills'
sponsors produced a compromise 19 that deleted provisions imposing joint and several liability and a right of contribution. 20 The deletions satisfied the bills' opponents by eliminating the harsh result
of holding each defendant potentially liable for the entire cleanup
21
cost if other defendants were insolvent.
The floor debates constitute the only legislative history addressing the compromise bill as a whole. Portions of the commentary suggest that the elimination of the joint and several liability
language did not necessarily intend to preclude courts from impos16 For a thorough examination of CERCLA's legislative history, see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). For a compilation of bills,
hearings, and debates on CERCLA, see ENmrL. L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATrVE His-

TORY (1982).

17

H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 7490 (1980), reprinted in 3
supra note 16, at 163 (1982); S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. 17,988 (1979). A third bill, H.R. 85, was also proposed but was not the focus of
attention in the final floor debates pertaining to the compromise. H.R. 85, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1979).
18
H.R. 7020, supra note 17, § 307(a); S. 1480, supra note 17, § 4(f).
19 According to Senator Stafford, the compromise proposal was a "combination of
the best of the three other bills, and an elimination of the worst, or at least the most
controversial. Frankly, it eliminate[d] 75 percent of what we were seeking in S. 1480.
But knowing of the urgent need for legislation, we were willing to do that." 126 CONG.
ENVrL. L. INST.,

REc. 30,935 (1980).

For statements by opponents of the liability section, see H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6141-42; 126 CONG. REC. 30,972 (1980) (remarks of Sen.
Helms calling imposition of joint and several liability coupled with industry-financed
fund "grossly unfair").
The compromise also deleted a federal cause of action for medical expenses and
personal loss, reduced the size of the Superfund, and altered industry and government
contributions to the Superfund. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,935 (1980) (remarks of Sen.
Stafford).
20
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(f), 126 CONG. REC. 30,909 (1980). The section
stipulated that "[in any action brought under this section or section 6(c) [imposingjoint
and several liability for damages and removal costs] of this Act, a person held jointly and
severally liable with one or more other persons is entitled to seek contribution from
such persons to the extent of the proportionate liability of such persons." Id.
21
Objecting to the joint and several liability provision in S. 1480, Senator Helms
said it "received intense and well-deserved criticism from a number of sources, since it
could impose financial responsibility for massive costs and damages awards on persons
who contributed only minimally (ifat all) to a release or injury." 126 CONG. REC. 30,972
(1980).
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ingjoint and several liability on multiple defendants. For example,
Senator Randolph, sponsor of the compromise proposal, stated:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is joint and several liability. Any reference
to these terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint tortfeasors will be determined under common or previous statutory
22
law.
Representative Florio, House sponsor of the compromise bill, emphasized the use of federal common law:
[T]his bill refers to section 311 of the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] and to traditional and evolving principles of common law in determining the liability of such joint tortfeasors. To
insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the
23
further development of a Federal common law in this area.
On the other hand, Senator Helms, an opponent of the legislation,
stated that the compromise bill clearly foreclosed joint and several
liability. According to Helms, eliminating the joint and several liability provision limited defendants' liability to only "those costs and
damages that [the government] can prove were caused by the defendant's conduct."'24 Thus, the legislative history does not definitively indicate whether, by deleting joint and several liability from
CERCLA, Congress actually intended to foreclose its application to
cases arising under that statute.
2.

District Court Decisions

The absence of a specific provision allocating liability among
multiple tortfeasors, and the resulting disagreement among members of Congress over the proper interpretation of the compromise
draft, have left the responsibility for allocating liability in a CERCLA
126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio). Representative Florio's
remarks indicate that Senator Randolph's reference to "previous statutory law," supra
note 22, means § 311 of the FWPCA. The court in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984), interpreted the
phrase "previous statutory law" to refer to § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA).
Courts have interpreted § 311 of the FWPCA as imposing strict liability, see supra
note 18, and as allowing the imposition ofjoint and several liability in situations involving multiple defendants. United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 557 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Curtis Bay court also noted that a defendant that
pays for more of its fair share of damages is entitled to contribution from other defendants. Id.
24
126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
22
23
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enforcement action to the courts. District courts confronting liability allocation in CERCLA section 107 cost recovery actions have
uniformly imposed joint and several liability if the defendants have
caused an indivisible harm.2 5 The courts have examined GERCLA's
legislative history and concluded that by deleting the joint and several language, Congress intended the courts to apply flexible common law principles of liability allocation to CERCLA rather than a
rigid, legislative mandate that joint and several liability apply in
every case. 2 6 The courts have further reasoned that federal com25
United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENv-rL. L. INST.) 20,385 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 20,272 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A&F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In
each of these cases the court imposed the joint and several liability standard advocated
by the government. For a discussion of the liability allocation rule chosen by the courts,
see infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
Several courts have extended the joint and several liability standard they found in
§ 107 of CERCLA to abatement actions under § 106. See supra note 19. Price, 577 F.
Supp at 1113; Conservation Chem., 14 ENv'rL. L. REP. at 20,209; Northeastern Pharmaceutical,
579 F. Supp. at 844-45. One recent decision, United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L.

REP. (ENV'T L. INST.) 20,385, 20,387 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984), has not followed the other

decisions. String/ellow held that § 106 provides equitable remedies distinct from the legal
remedies of § 107 and that, as a result, § 106(a) does not impose joint and several liability to abate hazardous substance pollution. According to the court, applying joint and
several liability to § 106 actions would give the EPA an alternative way to collect damages which would be inappropriate for an equitable remedy. Id.
26 E.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (W.D. Mo.
1984). These courts have followed the reasoning of Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at
802. See Conservation Chem., 589 F. Supp. at 62-63 (quoting Chem-Dyne). In Chem-Dyne the
court examined CERCLA's legislative history to determine congressional intent with regard to the liability allocation issue. The court looked to the commentary of Congressmen Stafford, Randolph, and Florio (sponsors of the bill), see supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text, and explained that although the remarks of a single legislator do not
control, the statements of the legislation's sponsors deserve substantial consideration
when interpreting the statute. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 807 (citing Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979)). Assessing the commentary, the court concluded that "a reading of the entire legislative history in context reveals that the scope of
liability and term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a mandatory legislative
standard applicable in all situations which might produce inequitable results in some
cases." Id. at 808. The court continued, "[T]he term was omitted in order to have the
scope of liability determined under common law principles." Id.
Critics of the Chem-Dyne decision argue that the court gave the floor statements of
sponsors Randolph, Stafford, and Florio more weight than they deserved. Price, Dividing the Costs of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several Liability
Appropriate?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 339, 354-55 (1984). These critics argue that because the
bill's sponsors could not secure passage of the bill without deleting joint and several
liability terms, their statements were not entitled to the substantial consideration the
Chem-Dyne court accorded them. Id. at 355. These critics further contend that the remarks of CERCLA opponents, such as Senator Helms, should receive greater weight
than those of the bill's supporters because, as opponents, their "position represents the
filter through which the final bill had to flow in order to pass." Id. at 346.
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mon law should provide the liability allocation rule because the hazardous waste problem and CERCLA's corrective program have
national scope and significance and thus implicate uniquely federal
27
interests.
The district courts have identified two uniquely federal interests. First, they have concluded that the improper disposal or release of hazardous wastes is a complex, national problem.2 8
Hazardous substances dumped at a waste site typically originate in
several states, and pollution of land and groundwater often crosses
state boundaries.2 9 Second, the courts have reasoned that because
general revenues and excise taxes finance the Superfund, the United
States's ability to protect its financial interest in the trust fund is
30
directly related to the scope of liability under CERCLA.
Federal courts seeking to develop a common law of liability allocation have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 t or to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).3 2 Section 875 of
the Restatement imposes joint and several liability when two or more
tortfeasors cause a single and indivisible harm. 3 3 Sections 433A and
881 of the Restatement apportion liability when tortfeasors acting in27

Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808-09; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1337-38; South

CarolinaRetycling, 14 ENri.. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,275-76; A&F Materials,578 F.
Supp. at 1255; Conservation Chem., 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,209; String/ellow, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,386-87. But see NortheasternPharmaceutical,

579 F. Supp. at 843-45 (refraining from deciding whether federal or state law applied to
liability allocation question because both yielded same result in case).
The district courts justified formulating federal common law by resting on the rule
that federal courts may create federal common law to protect uniquely federal interests.
E.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808-09. See also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials,
451 U.S. 630, 640-42 (1981) (federal courts may fashion federal common law to further
uniquely federal interests); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981) (same). See also infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing fourth type of
case in which federal courts may generate federal common law).
28
E.g., Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1338; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808.
29
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808. The uniquely federal interest implicated by
interstate hazardous waste pollution resembles the strong federal concern over interstate water pollution discussed in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee I). See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text (discussing filling CERCLA's
gaps with federal common law right of contribution based on Milwaukee I rationale).
30
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808; String/ellow, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L.
INST.) at 20,387; see also A&F Materials,578 F. Supp. at 1255 (recognizing federal government's interest in preserving stability of Superfund). Some district courts cited
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943), and held that the United
States's financial interest in the trust fund is a right, obligation, and responsibility that
justifies the development of special federal common law. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
31
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 875, 881 (1976).
32 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. 1983).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1976). The Restatement recognizes a
right of contribution among tortfeasors held jointly and severally liable. Under § 886A
two or more tortfeasors liable to the same person for the same harm have a right of
contribution among themselves. Id. § 886A.

676

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:668

dependently cause distinct harms or a single harm involving some
reasonable basis for division according to each tortfeasor's activity.34 Alternatively, courts have interpreted section 311 of the
FWPCA as allowing joint and several liability and have applied that
liability standard to CERCLA. 35 According to the courts, the defendant bears the burden of proving that an injury is divisible and
36
consequently that liability is apportionable.
II
THE POSSIBILrr

THAT CONGRESS CREATED A FEDERAL

RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG

CERCLA

DEFENDANTS

In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.3 7 and Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,38 the Supreme Court held
that "a right to contribution may arise [under federal law] in either
of two ways: first, through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear implication; or, second, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal
common law of contribution. ' 39 The possibility exists that despite
the deletion of a specific provision granting a right of contribution,
Congress still expressly or impliedly created a statutory right of contribution for CERCLA defendants.

34

Section 433A states in part:

Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or

(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
Id. § 433A.
Section 881 states:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously, cause distinct
harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division
according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for
the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused.

Id. § 881.
No right of contribution is available for tortfeasors who are liable only for the portion of the harm that they caused. Id. § 886A.
35 M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d at 438-39; United States v. Bear Marine Servs., 509 F.
Supp. 710, 718-19 (E.D. La. 1980); see also Northeastern Pharmaceutical,579 F. Supp. at
844-45 (joint and several liability existed on FWPCA and state common law grounds).
36 E.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810 (relying on § 433B of Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Torts for burden of proof rule).
37

38
39

451 U.S. 630 (1981).
451 U.S. 77 (1981).
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638 (citing Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90-91).
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Section 107(e)(2) of CERCLA, 40 pertaining to cost recovery actions, arguably suggests that Congress expressly adopted a right of
contribution under CERCLA. Section 107(e) (2) provides, "Nothing
in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or
any other person subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise
against any person." 4 ' TheJustice Department has argued that section 107(e)(2) creates a right of contribution among parties liable
under section 107.42
The district court in Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. 4 3 has
agreed with the Justice Department's position. The court interpreted the deletion of the Gore Amendment, 4 4 which provided for a
right of contribution, and Congress's substitution of § 107(e)(2), as
showing Representative Gore's intention that the right of contribu45
tion be embodied in § 107(e)(2).
The conclusions of both the Justice Department and the Wehner
court are incorrect. Section 107(e)(2) is a savings clause preserving
any cause of action that a liable party has against any person.4 6 As a
savings clause, section 107(e)(2) cannot create a right of contribution. Indeed, it may only preserve a right of contribution created
elsewhere.
The Wehner court's argument-that the Gore Amendment's
right of contribution is embodied in section 107(e)(2)-is also
flawed. The rejection of the Gore Amendment indicates only that
the House did not favor an express right of contribution. The addition of a savings clause, § 107(e)(2), does not establish a right of
contribution. Moreover, Senate bill S. 1480, which contained the
contribution provision, also contained language similar to that in
section 107(e)(2). 4 7 Congress's deliberate deletion of an explicit
contribution provision suggests that it did not intend section 107 to
provide a right of contribution. Had Congress wanted a statutory
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982).
Id.
The Department has maintained that "[tihis provision ... confirms that a defendant held liable for response costs has the right to seek contribution from any other
person responsible for a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance." 126
CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980) (statement submitted on Department's behalf by Rep.
Florio).
43 613 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
44
126 CONG. REC. 26,785 (1980).
45 613 F. Supp. at 1565.
46
See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 343 (arguing that § 107(e)(2) preserves existing claims
and right of contribution if found elsewhere in statute).
47 S. 1480, supra note 17, § 4(n)(5).
40
41
42
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right of contribution, it presumably would have kept the contribution provision rather than inconspicuously tucked a contribution
right into section 107(e)(2).
Alternatively, some have argued that section 107(a)(4)(B) 48 authorizes potentially liable persons who pursue their own cleanup operation to recover cleanup costs from other responsible parties. In
City of Philadelphiav. Stepan Chemical Co. 49 a district court held that
because the subsection deems CERCLA defendants liable for "any
other. . . costs of response incurred by any other person," 5 0 Philadelphia could recover cleanup costs from other responsible parties,
despite the city's ownership of the waste site and potential liability
to federal or state governments if those authorities had commenced
cleanup. 5 1 The court construed section 107(a) to establish three categories of "persons" entitled to recover cleanup costs from responsible parties: the federal government, the state governments, and
"any other person." 5 2 According to the court, because CERCLA's
definition of "person" includes federal and state governments, the
term "any other person" refers to persons other than federal or
state governments rather than persons other than those made responsible under the act. 53 Thus, the court in effect found a right of
contribution by viewing section 107(a) (4)(B) to give "a private party
the right to recover response costs from responsible third
54
parties."
Finding a right of contribution in section 107(a)(4)(B), however, overextends the intended impact of the section. Section
107(a)(4)(B) may allow persons who lack responsibility for illegal
waste dumping, but who nonetheless are potentially liable as site
owners or operators, to recover cleanup costs from parties responsible for the dumping. The section does not, however, authorize contribution among parties held liable for cleanup costs. The original
Senate bill 55 contained language similar to section 107(a) (4)(B), in
addition to a separate provision for contribution. Congress's deletion of the contribution provision counters any suggestion that it
intended a contribution right in the text of subsection (B). Thus,
neither section 107(e)(2) nor section 107(a)(4)(B) expressly creates
a right of contribution.
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982). For complete text of § 107(a)(4), see supra
note 10.
49 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
50 Id. at 1142 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982)).
51
Id. at 1143.
52 Id. at 1142 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982)).
53 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982)).
54 Id. at 1143.
55 S. 1480, supra note 17.
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Federal courts may create remedies for a federal statute by inferring the remedies from the statutory scheme. 56 Such cases are
rare. 57 The Supreme Court's marked reluctance to infer a private
cause of action under federal regulatory statutes 58 stems from separation of powers concerns. The Court is hesitant to intrude upon
the legislature's domain by enlarging the remedial provisions of a
statute beyond the scope Congress adopted. 59 Nevertheless, in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries the Supreme Court identified
specific factors indicative of congressional intent to create a statutory right of contribution. 60 These factors are the statutory language, the legislative history, the underlying purpose and structure
of the statutory scheme, and the likelihood that Congress intended
to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies. 61 The deter56 See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 285 (1963) (discussing implied causes of action in federal statutes not explicitly
providing such relief.
57 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (inferring private cause of
action under § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Securities legislation has been
the largest source of implied rights of action. See Note, supra note 56, at 286 (citing
cases); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (inferring injunctive
remedy from Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 where Act provided only for penalties).
58 See United States v. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no implied private cause
of action for contribution under Sherman and Clayton Acts); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981) (no implied private cause of action to enforce § 10 of Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no implied private cause of action for contribution
under Title VII and Equal Pay Act); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754
(1981) (no implied private cause of action for back wages under Davis-Bacon Act);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private cause of
action for damages under § 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975) (no implied stockholder's derivative action under Federal Election Campaign Act).
59 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 ("The authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy
which Congress has decided not to adopt").
60 Id. at 91; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639.
61 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639. The Court derived
the four factors for ascertaining congressional intent from a line of cases beginning with
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
In Texas Industries the Court mentioned an additional factor originally found in Cort,
the identity of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. 451 U.S. at 639. The
court did not deem this factor helpful for finding a right of contribution because the
plaintiffs, antitrust wrongdoers, did not belong to the class for whose benefit Congress
enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts; instead they belonged to the class whose activities Congress intended to regulate. When applied to CERCLA defendants, this additional factor also does not appear to support inferring a right of contribution. Because
CERCLA defendants, like antitrust defendants, belong to the class whose activities Congress wants to regulate, one doubts that Congress would intend to mitigate the liability
of the wrongdoers. However, although CERCLA defendants are members of the regulated class, liability under CERCLA, unlike liability under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, is strict, and therefore defendants may be nonculpable, nonnegligent parties. In
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mination of whether CERCLA implicitly creates a right of contribution requires an analysis of these four factors.
Because CERCLA's provisions make no reference to contribution, 62 the first factor, statutory language 63 cannot serve as a basis
for inferring a contribution cause of action. Nor does the second
factor, the legislative history of CERCLA, 64 suggest that Congress
intended to create a statutory, as opposed to a common law, right of
contribution. Rather, congressional commentary on the final compromise bill indicates an intent to abdicate the formulation of liability to the courts: "issues of liability not resolved by [the] act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law." 65 If the Senate had intended to create a statutory right of contribution, it would likely have retained language similar to that
66
which it used in the original bill.

One commentator has argued that the drafters of CERCLA may
have omitted sections to reach a compromise while hoping that the
courts would infer the omitted provisions. 67 In support of this theory, the commentator notes that despite the congressional omission
of statutory language imposing strict liability, courts have interpreted the statute as imposing strict liability. 68 This argument fails
for two reasons. First, the legislative history of the deletion of strict
liability language differs from the history surrounding the deletion
of the contribution provision. Although Congress deleted specific
strict liability language from CERCLA, it added language that
adopts section 311 of the FWPCA as the liability standard for the
statute. 69 Courts have consistently construed section 311 as imposing a strict liability standard. 70 Congress was aware of the effect of
such a nonpunitive regulatory situation, Congress does not intend to punish past conduct but would rather regulate present and future conduct. To allow contribution as a
way of spreading the cost of liability would not conflict with this regulatory intent.
62
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
63
For a critical discussion of the arguments that § 107(e)(2) and § 107(a)(4)(B) authorize a right to contribution, see supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
65
126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement by Sen. Randolph) (see supra text accompanying note 22).
66 S 1480, supra note 20, § 4(0; see also supra text immediately following note 47
(arguing that deletion of explicit contribution provision indicates no congressional intent to create statutory right of contribution).
67
Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 706, 722 n.113 (1983).
68 Id. For further discussion of the courts' imposition of strict liability under CERCLA, see Faron & Feldman, Superfund Liability Outline, 3 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LiTi. REP. 133, 149-51 (1982). See also cases collected supra note 8 (district court
decisions imposing strict liability).
69 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). The courts have consistently interpreted § 311 to impose
strict liability. See supra note 8.
70
See supra note 8.
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adopting section 311: "We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the
Clean Water Act [FWPCA] .... ,,71 In contrast, the congressional
commentary on contribution suggests that rather than creating a
statutory right of contribution, Congress intended that federal
courts remain free to determine when joint and several liability and
contribution should apply.2
Second, the very need for a compromise measure indicates that
the majority of Congress did not want CERCLA to includejoint and
73
several liability and contribution provisions of broad application.
Congress intended that common law principles govern the contribution issue.
Thus, the first two factors, statutory language and legislative
history, fail to show congressional intent to create a statutory right
of contribution. The Court in Texas Industries indicated that if the
statutory language and legislative history do not evince the requisite
congressional intent, then the implication inquiry should cease.7 4
This Note nonetheless briefly considers the remaining factors.
The third factor, the purpose and structure of CERCLA, is consistent with a right of contribution. CERCLA has two purposes:
promoting rapid cleanup of hazardous waste sites and encouraging
careful handling of hazardous wastes.7 5 Because contribution would
allow potentially liable parties to recover from other liable parties, it
would encourage parties to pursue voluntary remedial work and
71

126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).

72

See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The statement by Senator Randolph

addresses "issues of liability not resolved by this act" and gives as an example joint and

several liability and states that the "liability ofjoint tort feasors will be determined under
common or previous statutory law." 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). Because contribution is also an issue of liability of joint tortfeasors not resolved by CERCLA, Senator
Randolph's comment seems to refer to the deletion of the contribution provision as well
as the joint and several liability provision. Consequently the comment suggests that as
with joint and several liability, the courts must decide whether a right of contribution
exists under CERCLA.

In two recent cases the Supreme Court cautioned that federal common law does not
provide an automatic right of contribution. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.
77, 96 (1981). In these cases, the Court refused to infer a federal statutory right or to
create a federal common law right of contribution under the Sherman Act, the Equal Pay
Act, and Title VII. The Court has however, approved a nonstatutory federal right of

contribution among joint tortfeasors in admiralty cases. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). Therefore, if CERCLA defendants have a federal common law right of contribution, this right must find support in one of several

recognized instances where federal courts possess the power to develop special federal
common law. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
74 Tams Industries, 451 U.S. at 639.
75 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17, 22, reprinted hi 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119; S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
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other forms of settlement, in furtherance of CERCLA's cleanup
goal. 7 6 A right of contribution would also address CERCLA's second goal, encouraging careful hazardous waste management, by
spreading cleanup costs among all responsible parties. The prospect
of liability for contribution to other responsible parties would deter
careless handling of wastes by waste generators, transporters, and
operators of waste facilities. 77 Without a CERCLA rule of contribution, these other parties might escape liability unless the government is able to locate and sue them, a difficult and unlikely
78
undertaking.
Opponents of contribution under CERCLA counter that contribution would impede the prompt cleanup goal by discouraging settlement. They maintain that contribution would give responsible
parties incentive to litigate and attempt a successful defense of the
action rather than agree to a settlement. 7 9 The prospect of litigation would involve little risk for responsible parties because in the
event of liability, the responsible parties could still recover contribution from settling parties. Additionally, parties who settle would not
receive repose because they would still remain liable to other responsible parties for contribution. 80 The opponents' arguments do
not apply, however, to a contribution rule prohibiting contribution
claims against persons who settle in good faith and reducing a plaintiff's claim against other tortfeasors by the amount the settling party
76
For detailed treatment of Superfund settlement agreements, see Note, supra note
67; Rikleen, Negotiating Superfund Settlement Agreements, 10 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 697
(1982-83). In a typical Superfund settlement agreement, generators propose their own
remedial action to clean up a site. The EPA then consents to the settlement by giving an
administrative order, or a court consents by giving ajudicial consent decree. Note, supra
note 67, at 719; Rikleen, supra, at 706. For a discussion of the advantages of settlement
to both sides see id. at 703-05. Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1135, exemplifies how
contribution would encourage voluntary cleanup. In Stepan Chemical the city of Philadelphia apparently pursued the cleanup on the assumption that it could recover the costs of
cleanup from the responsible parties.
77 In the antitrust context one court has taken the position that because most large
businesses are risk-averse, the very possibility of imposition of sole liability has a greater
deterrent effect than the imposition of a proportionate share of the liability. Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979). This
argument does not directly apply to CERCLA defendants because the defendants can
vary greatly in size and the cost of hazardous waste site cleanup is potentially immense.
78 Most of the CERCLA § 107 suits that the EPA has brought have involved only a
small number of the known potentially responsible parties. For example, in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982), the government sued about 40 companies. About 150 companies, however, escaped suit by agreeing to settle with the EPA.
79 Supplemental Memorandum of Certain Settling Third-Party Defendants (filed
Feb. 16, 1984), United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed
Aug. 26, 1982).
80 Id.
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paid in settlement.8 1 This contribution rule encourages settlement
because a plaintiff knows how much of his claim he is risking by settling with one party and the settler gains protection from the contri8 2
bution claims of other liable parties.
CERCLA's statutory structure also comports with a right of
contribution. The creation of the Superfund indicates an intent to
spread the costs of hazardous waste cleanup across the chemical industry rather than to impose costs on a few responsible parties. 8 3 A
right of contribution conforms with this intent by spreading cleanup
costs among all responsible parties. Moreover, contribution is consistent with the underlying regulatory and remedial character of
CERCLA. One might argue that contribution mitigates the liability
of wrongdoing defendants by broadly distributing the judgment
burden among responsible parties. CERCLA defendants, however,
81 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, drafter of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, has recognized the settlement incentive provided by a contribution rule that bars contribution claims against persons who
settle in good faith, and has fashioned such a rule in § 4 of the UNIFORM CoNrRIBuTIoN
AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955). Section 4 provides:

When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but
it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).

82 In proposing the revised § 4 of the Uniform Act in 1955, the drafters explained
that the original 1939 Uniform Act had discouraged settlements because it required a
plaintiff to reduce his claim against other nonsettling joint tortfeasors by the pro-rata
share of the released tortfeasor. 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975). According to the drafters, plaintiffs often refused to accept any release containing a provision reducing damages to the
extent of the pro-rata share of the released tortfeasor because the plaintiff would receive
no indication of the pro-rata share size until after the judgment against the other
tortfeasors. The 1939 provision also did not prevent collusion between a plaintiff and a
released tortfeasor against an unreleased tortfeasor. Id.
The 1955 revision of the act cures these problems by barring contribution claims
against persons who settle in good faith and by reducing a plaintiff's claim against other
jointly liable defendants by the settlement amounts. The contribution rule in § 4 thereby
provides to settlers the repose that induces settlement. The requirement that the release or covenant be given in good faith gives a court the opportunity to determine
whether collusion exists. If it does, the settling party is not discharged from the contribution claims of other parties. Id. In the Chem-Dyne case the United States argued that
the court should adopt § 4 of the Uniform Act as federal common law. Response of the
United States to Motion to Dismiss at 14 (filed Mar. 14, 1984), United States v. ChemDyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982).
83
Response of the United States to Motion to Dismiss at 10 (filed Mar. 14, 1984),
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982).
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often include nonnegligent parties held strictly liable.8 4 Therefore,
the concern that contribution would ameliorate the liability of cul85
pable parties does not arise.
The fourth factor, the likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or supplement state law, also favors the recognition of a
right of contribution under CERCLA. Contribution among jointly
and severally liable parties is not exclusively relegated to state law; it
exists in federal statutory and common law. 86 Because CERCLA liability is federal in nature, federal law should govern the extent of
liability under the statute and a defendants' ability to seek
contribution.
Uniformity interests also support a federal contribution rule.
Although thirty-nine states have contribution statutes or allow contribution by judicial decision, the timing of the contribution claim
varies. Some states allow contribution claims only after judgment
and payment of a plaintiff's claim.8 7 Other states permit contribution claims before judgment.8 8 The effect of a settlement agreement on the contribution claims of nonsettling parties also varies by
state.8 9 A uniform federal rule, however, barring contribution
claims against parties who settle in good faith and requiring a plaintiff to reduce his claim against nonsettling parties by the amounts
paid in settlement, is preferable because it would promote settlement and cleanup. 90 Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act could serve as a source for this federal rule.
Supplementing state contribution schemes with a uniform federal rule would conform with the CERCLA goal of closing the gap in
federal and state environmental statutes by providing a single system for the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites.9 1 The Love
84 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). For a discussion of parties subject to liability under
CERCLA, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.

85 For a discussion of the argument that contribution mitigates the burden of culpable defendants, see infra note 140.
86 In the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982), Congress fashioned three express provisions for contribution: 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78i(e), and 78r(b). Contribution also occurs
as part of the special federal common law created in admiralty cases. E.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
87 An example of a post-judgment contribution rule is § 4 of the UNIFORM CoTrRIBuTiON AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, supra note 81.
88 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 (1978) (example of prejudgment con-

tribution rule).
89 See UNIF. CONrRIBTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955) (barring contribution claims against parties who settle in good faith); see also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing § 4 of Uniform Act).
90 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
91 See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980); 126 CONG. REC. H945960 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). For further discussion of RCRA and the gap CERCLA
filled, see infra note 114.
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Canal incident 9 2 in Niagara Falls, New York, demonstrated the gross
inadequacy of then existing state and federal legislative schemes.
During the Love Canal incident, imprecise division of administrative
authority obstructed the ability of state and local officials to react to
the improper waste disposal. The EPA and other federal agencies,
unsure of their jurisdictional and financial powers, also failed to respond adequately. 9 3 Because CERCLA purports to address these inadequacies, Congress clearly intended it to supplement existing
state laws for hazardous waste cleanup, rather than relegate hazardous waste cleanup solely to state law.
Despite the favorable outcome of the third and fourth factors,
the implication analysis reveals no implied cause of action for contribution under CERCLA. The critical first two factors, statutory
language and legislative history, fail to show congressional intent to
create the statutory right.
III
FEDERAL COMMON LAW RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG

CERCLA DEFENDANTS
Although CERCLA neither explicitly nor implicitly provides for
a right of contribution, courts could still apply contribution to CERCLA cases by looking to federal common law. Federal courts lack
the power to create a "federal general common law,"' 9 4 but they can
generate special federal common law in certain areas. Commentators95 have divided Supreme Court decisions creating special federal common law into four categories: (1) filling statutory
interstices, 9 6 (2) inferring remedies from federal statutes, 9 7 (3) con92 See generally S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA
(1982) (discussing details of Love Canal incident and public outcry as to danger of hazardous waste); Report of the New York Office of Public Health, Love Canal: Public Health Time

Bomb (1978) (same).
93 See Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation Under the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse,
Compensation and Liability Act, 52 UMKC L. REV. 364, 365-66 (1984).
94 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
95 C. Wright, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (3d ed. 1976); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 756-832 (2d ed. 1973); Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And
of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of Nationaland State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957). See also Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) (primarily discussing decisions
that infer remedies from statutes or create law in areas of federal interest).
96
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) ("It may happen that
new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal
common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered
to appraise the equities of the suits ....");United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (although frequently no specific federal legislation governs particular transaction to which United States is party, this silence provides no ra-
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struing a jurisdictional grant or a legislative history as an authorization to fashion federal common law, 98 and (4) spontaneously
generating law in areas of special federal interest. 9 9
The district courts have created a federal common law rule of
joint and several liability on the grounds that both hazardous waste
pollution and CERCLA's corrective scheme involve uniquely federal
interests.10 0 These decisions fall into the fourth category, areas of
special federal interest. The courts, however, cannot invoke the
same approach when attempting to fashion a common law right of
contribution under CERCLA. As the Court in Texas Industries
pointed out, an action for contribution among private parties does
not trigger federal concerns reaching the high threshold of
" 'uniquely federal interests' . . . that oblige courts to formulate
federal common law." 10 1 The federal government is not a party to a
contribution cause of action under CERCLA. Further, the uniquely
federal interest that courts invoked to impose joint and several liability, the United States's ability to protect its financial interest in
the Superfund,10 2 would be satisfied once courts impose joint and
several liability. Thus, whether CERCLA defendants have a right of
contribution among themselves is of no direct consequence to the
United States and does not implicate a "uniquely federal interest"
necessary to generate federal common law.
The courts, however, can justify creating a federal common law
right of contribution under CERCLA. First, federal courts could
choose to create a uniform contribution rule to fill the gaps that
Congress left in CERCLA's liability provisions.10 3 Second, federal
courts could interpret CERCLA's legislative history and statutory
scheme as authorizing them to create a federal common law rule.
tionale for limiting reach of federal laws). See generally Mishkin, supra note 95, at 799-800
("[E]ffective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to
declare, as a matter of federal common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules... necessary to
fill in interstitially .... ).
97 See cases collected supra note 57.
98 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (concluding that
congressional intent to give federal courts substantive lawmaking power existed in § 301
of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which granted federal courts jurisdiction
over union contract violation suits).
99 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964) (federal
law governs legal disputes affecting international relations); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (absent congressional legislation, federal
common law governs federal government's disbursement of funds); Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (federal common law
determines whether to apportion water of interstate stream).
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
100
101
Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642.
102
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103
For a detailed explanation of the gaps, see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying
text.
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Gap Filling

In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1)104 the Supreme Court
discussed gap filling in the context of federal water pollution statutes. In Milwaukee I, the Court recognized a federal common law of
nuisance in certain waters.' 0 5 Illinois brought suit against the city of
Milwaukee to abate a public nuisance caused by the city's disposal of
sewage into Lake Michigan. Even though the statute did not prescribe the remedy that Illinois sought, the Court maintained that
"the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only
federal remedies available."' 0 6 According to the Court, federal
courts could create federal common law to abate nuisances in inter10 7
state waters.
The Court based its decision on the competence of and need
for the federal courts to fill gaps Congress left in the FWPCA and
other federal water pollution statutes. The Court emphasized the
strong federal concern for abating water pollution, a policy evidenced by the FWPCA and other federal statutes.' 0 8 In addition,
the Court noted its past practice of fashioning federal common law
in areas in which an overriding federal interest triggered a need for
a uniform rule of decision or in which the controversy touched basic
interests of federalism.' 0 9 The Court, however, cautioned that "new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the
field of federal common law of nuisance," although no preemption
had yet occurred.10 Thus, in Milwaukee I, the Court applied federal
104
406 U.S. 91 (1972). Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II) (subsequent to Milwaukee I, Congress filled gaps of FWPCA by amendment).
105
The Milwaukee 11 Court summarized the background of the dispute:
Illinois' claim was first brought to this Court when Illinois sought
leave to file a complaint under our original jurisdiction. [In Milwaukee 1]
we declined to exercise original jurisdiction because the dispute was not
between two States, and Illinois had available an action in federal district
court. The Court reasoned that federal law applied to the dispute...
concerning pollution of interstate waters [and that] Illinois could [therefore] appeal to federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 309-10. Milwaukee 1I arose from Illinois's action brought in
federal district court.
106 Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103 (citing Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457).
107
Id. at 103-04.
108
Id. at 101-02.
109 Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963)).
110 Id. at 107.
In Milwaukee II the Court again faced the nuisance issue but found a statutory preemption of federal common law. In the nine year interval between Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II, Congress passed the FWPCA Amendments of 1972, Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)), which established a permit system regulating discharges
of pollutants into national waters. In holding that the amendments had preempted federal common law, the Court relied on Congress's view of the amendments as "total[ly]
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common law to a controversy that exposed a gap in a federal regulatory scheme and implicated a strong federal policy.
The Court's filling of statutory gaps by generating federal common law in Milwaukee I supports the creation of a federal common
law right of contribution under CERCLA's liability provisions.
First, significant gaps exist in the provisions of CERCLA's liability
scheme. With the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)" ' Congress first attempted to combat the hazardous waste
disposal problem by authorizing the EPA to regulate generators,
transporters, and disposers of hazardous waste, and to establish future standards for chemical waste disposal. 1 12 Although prospectively comprehensive, RCRA failed to address past disposal
operations and to provide for cleanup of present health-threatening
waste sites. 1 13 Responding to RCRA's deficiencies, CERCLA addresses the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites.1 4 CERCLA's
liability scheme, however, fails to specify how to allocate liability
among multiple responsible parties.15 Second, CERCLA cases implicate a strong federal interest. RCRA and CERCLA together
stand for the strong federal policy of abatement of toxic waste
hazards similar to the federal interest in abatement of water pollution that the Milwaukee I Court held sufficient to generate a federal
1 16
common law of nuisance.
restructuring" and "complete[ly] rewriting" existing water pollution legislation. 451

U.S. at 317. The Court stated Congress had "occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative
agency." Id. The Court also narrowly read the Act's savings clauses and concluded that
these clauses did not preserve the federal common law remedy recognized in Milwaukee
I. Id. at 327-29.
111 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). For a detailed discussion of RCRA's regulatory
framework, see Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation
in Wisconsin, 66 MAR. L. REV. 223, 225-42 (1983).
112
See Remarks of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural
Resources Division, before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting at 3 (Aug. 9,
1982) ("RCRA's primary thrust is prospective regulation of existing sites.").
113 See 126 CONG. REC. H26,359 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Brown); see also infra note 114 (discussing prospectivity of RCRA's regulations).
114
Because RCRA regulates primarily prospective hazardous waste disposal, the
problem of releases from inactive or abandoned hazardous waste sites remained unaddressed. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), the court stated that "[a]pparently, Congress' major purpose in
passing RCRA was to control the manner of disposing of hazardous wastes as opposed
to cleaning up the results of past disposal." NortheasternPharmaceutical,579 F. Supp. at
834. In CERCLA Congress addressed the past disposal site problem by providing for
cleanup, liability, and compensation with regard to releases of hazardous wastes at inactive disposal sites. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980); 126 CONG.
REC. H9459-60 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
115 See supra text preceding note 12.
116 In Milwaukee I the Court concluded that federal water pollution statutes and
aquatic life protection statutes represent a strong federal policy of abatement of water
pollution. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 101-02. The threat of hazardous waste pollution is
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The existence of the gap in CERCLA's liability scheme and the
presence of a strong federal interest give federal courts a sufficient
basis to fashion a federal common law of contribution. Most courts
have applied joint and several liability to CERCLA cases. 1 17 Filling
the liability allocation gap with contribution thus makes sense because joint and several liability and contribution are companion
rights."t 8 Indeed, fairness dictates that when a court holds parties
jointly and severally liable for a hazardous waste release, one party
should not bear the entire burden of the judgment while the other
parties escape liability.119
B.

Congressional Authorization

A second basis for federal courts to fashion a federal common
law rule of contribution under CERCLA is congressional authorization.' 20 Recently, in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc.121 the Federal District
Court for Colorado held that CERCLA's legislative history revealed
congressional intent to empower federal courts to develop a federal
common law contribution rule. 12 2 After examining the congresno less serious than the threat of water pollution. Moreover, as with water pollution,
Congress has responded to hazardous waste pollution with regulatory statutes (RCRA
and CERCLA) indicating a strong federal policy of abatement. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, the United States produces more than 57 million metric tons of
hazardous waste annually, 90%o of which is improperly disposed of. See S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
117
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
118
The Senate bill that ultimately became CERCLA, S. 1480, provided forjoint and
several liability and contribution. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. When Congress deleted the joint and several liability provision, it simultaneously deleted the contribution provision. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing deletion); see
also 126 CONG. REC. 30,935-36 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (same); 126 CONG.
REC. 30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) (same).
119
The majority of states and the Restatement (Second) of Torts allow parties held
jointly and severally liable to seek contribution. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87 n.17.
See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Restatement's joint and several
liability and contribution rules).
120
See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1522-23 (1969); see also
supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Lincoln
Mills that by its jurisdictional grant in Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress authorized federal courts to develop substantive law).
121
608 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
122

Id. at 1489-90.

In ASARCO, Colorado brought an action to recover response costs and damages
under CERCLA § 107 against three defendants, ASARCO, Inc., Resurrection Mining
Co., and Res-ASARCO Joint Venture. Id. at 1485. The three defendants filed thirdparty complaints seeking contribution from 15 other responsible parties, allegedly coowners of the hazardous release site. Id. The court denied Colorado's motion to dismiss the third party complaint, id. at 1493, and held that the congressional commentaries of Senator Randolph and Representative Florio evidenced congressional
authorization for the development of a federal common law of contribution. Id. at 1489.
The court adopted as federal common law the contribution rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which allows for contribution amongjointly and severally liable tortfeasors
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sional commentaries of Senator Randolph and Representative
Florio, 23 the court concluded that contribution is a liability issue
unaddressed by CERCLA which courts should resolve by applying
common law principles.' 24 Although the result in ASARCO is correct, the court's analysis is incomplete. The ASARCO court failed to
discuss certain factors considered by the Supreme Court in Texas Industries as relevant to determining whether congressional authorization exists.
The Court in Texas Industries'2 5 discussed three factors relevant
to determining whether Congress intended to authorize courts to
formulate a common law right of contribution: the language of the
statute, its legislative history, and the overall regulatory scheme.
These three factors are the same criteria the Court used to discern
an implied statutory right of contribution. 2 6 Although the factors
are the same, the focus of the inquiry is different. In a congressional
authorization analysis, courts inquire whether the factors indicate
27
that Congress authorized federal courts to develop common law.'
In an implication analysis, courts ask whether the factors show that
28
Congress impliedly created a statutory right.'
A comparison of CERCLA with the Sherman Act will illustrate
the focus of the congressional authorization analysis. The Court in
Texas Industries applied the three authorization factors to a Sherman
Act case and found no indication that Congress authorized federal
courts to create a right of contribution. As with CERCLA, the Sherman Act's statutory language provided no support for a congressional intent to empower courts to formulate a contribution rule
because it contained no reference to contribution. The Court determined that the Sherman Act's legislative history, although indicating
a congressional intent to give courts power to define substantive violations, failed to indicate an intent to empower courts to formulate
remedies or the kind of relief sought through contribution.12 9 The
Court also concluded that the scope and detail of the antitrust statuand conforms with the CERCLA goal of expeditious hazardous waste site cleanup. Id. at
1490-91.

See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
608 F. Supp. at 1489.
451 U.S. at 645 (analyzing three factors, but fixing no relative weight to any).
126
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127
451 U.S. at 645.
128
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
129
451 U.S. at 643-44. The Court distinguished the lawmaking powers conferred in
defining violations and the ability to fashion relief. Id. at 644. The Court also pointed
out that when the Sherman Act was adopted, the common law did not provide a right of
contribution among tortfeasors and that this omission raised a "permissible, though not
mandatory, inference. . . that Congress relied on court's continuing to apply principles
in effect at the time of enactment." Id. at n.17.
123
124
125
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tory scheme and its existence for ninety years without a contribution
amendment indicated that Congress did not authorize courts to for130
mulate a right of contribution.
CERCLA's legislative history differs from that of the Sherman
Act and indicates that Congress authorized federal courts to create a
common law right of contribution under CERCLA. First, CERCLA's legislative history expressly indicates that common law principles are to determine "issues of liability not resolved by [the]
act."' 3' Thus, in contrast to the deliberations preceding the Sherman Act, CERCLA's legislative history indicates an intent to give
courts the power to formulate rules allocating liability, including
rules of contribution and joint and several liability. Furthermore,
because thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia allowed contribution among tortfeasors at the time of CERCLA's enactment,1 3 2
the inference that Congress could not have contemplated a contribution rule when it referred to common law principles of liability
does not arise as it did with the Sherman Act.' 3 3 Finally, unlike the
legislative history of the antitrust laws, which does not mention contribution, 3 4 CERCLA's legislative history shows that the drafters
consistently treated contribution as a companion right to joint and
several liability.13 5 When Congress simultaneously deleted joint
and several liability and contribution, it explicitly suggested that
courts should determine both issues of liability through evolving
common law principles.
In addition, differences between the statutory scheme of CERCLA and the Sherman Act support the argument that Congress empowered courts to fashion a federal common law rule of
contribution under CERCLA. First, unlike the antitrust laws, CERCLA is a remedial rather than punitive legislative scheme.' 3 6 CER130
Id. at 645. The Court invoked the presumption that Congress deliberately omits
a remedy from a statute "when [it] has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." Id.
131
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
132
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87 n.17.
133
See supra note 129.
134
Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 630.
135
See supra notes 18-20, 118 and accompanying text.
136
CERCLA enforcement actions under § 107 impose liability for costs of cleanup
and for damages to natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In addition, the Act sets
liability limits for responsible parties, unless a release resulted from wilful misconduct,
in which case courts may impose full costs. Id. § 9607(c). Although these provisions
indicate that liability under CERCLA primarily seeks to compensate injured parties, the
Act allows assessment of punitive damages if responsible parties fail to comply with orders (under § 9604 or § 9606) to clean up or take remedial action. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
Note, however, that these punitive measures do not apply immediately upon a violation
of the statute (as with the treble damages provision of Sherman Act), but only after
responsible parties refuse to comply with administrative orders. Therefore, CERCLA
serves a predominantly remedial, rather than punitive, legislative purpose.
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CLA imposes strict liability on nonculpable, nonnegligent' 3 7 parties
who have a statutorily-imposed responsibility to clean up waste
sites. In contrast, the antitrust laws impose fault-based liability; defendant wrongdoers seek contribution to mitigate the consequences
39
of their wrongdoing. 13 8 Because CERCLA is remedial in nature,1
40
contribution would not mitigate the punishment of wrongdoers.'
In addition, contribution follows from the statute's overall remedial
purpose, expediting cleanup by distributing liability among all responsible parties.
Second, the gaps in CERCLA's liability scheme support the
conclusion that Congress authorized courts to fashion liability rules,
including a contribution rule. Because CERCLA's statutory scheme
contains gaps in its liability provisions, the Texas Industries presumption that Congress has deliberately omitted a remedy when it has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme does not apply. 141 The
combination of an incomplete statutory scheme with a legislative
history indicating congressional intent that federal courts use common law to fill the gaps provides a strong basis for inferring congressional authorization for the courts to fashion a common law rule
of contribution.
CONCLUSION

The absence of an express contribution provision in CERCLA
should not preclude federal courts from fashioning a common law
contribution rule for defendants held jointly and severally liable.
Without a CERCLA contribution rule, responsible parties not sued
by the government would escape liability, and the burden of cleanup
costs would fall on only some responsible parties. Federal courts
should base a creation of a common law right of contribution among
CERCLA defendants on the competence of federal courts to fill the
137
See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The most common nonculpable responsible party in a CERCLA suit is a nonnegligent (i.e., someone not shown to be
negligent) offsite generator. This term refers to a waste generator who arranged to have
hazardous substances disposed of at sites from which there later were releases or
threatened releases. Comment, supra note 9, at 10,226.
138 Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 635.
139
CERCLA does not punish for a defendant's initial violation, but the act does
provide punitive measures for failure to comply with cleanup/remedial action orders.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140
451 U.S. at 639. The Court explained that contribution might not comport with
a punitive purpose. "The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past,
and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers...
[and indicates] that Congress was [not] concerned with softening the blow on joint
wrongdoers." Id. With a primarily remedial, compensatory statute such as CERCLA,
Congress would remain less concerned that contribution ameliorated the liability of responsible parties. See supra note 61.
141
451 U.S. at 645. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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gaps in CERCLA with federal common law. The presence of an incomplete statutory scheme and a strong federal interest in abating
hazardous waste spills buttress the argument for gap filling by federal courts. Courts may also find a separate ground for fashioning
federal common law in CERCLA's legislative history and statutory
scheme which suggest that Congress authorized federal courts to fill
the statute's liability gaps with common law principles.
BarbaraJ. Gulino

